Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets by Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant
Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets
Ariel Rubinstein







Abstract. A behavioral dataset contains various preference relations displayed by a single
individual in di®erent payo®-irrelevant circumstances. We introduce a framework for eliciting the
individual's welfare preferences in such cases. In this framework, the di®erent preference relations
displayed by the individual are the outcome of a cognitive process that distorts an unobserved
preference relation re°ecting the individual's welfare. We demonstrate the operation of eliciting the
underlying welfare preferences from behavioral datasets for several cognitive processes.
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11. Introduction
Welfare analysis requires the speci¯cation of a welfare criterion. In economic models where an
individual has clear preferences that guide his choices, these preferences are usually assumed to
re°ect his welfare. However, in many real-life situations, an individual displays di®erent preferences
in di®erent frames, where a frame includes details that appear to be irrelevant to the individual's
own interests (see Salant and Rubinstein (2008)). Frames may be external, a consequence of the
environment in which the individual acts, or internal, a consequence of the individual's state of
mind. Frames may a®ect the cognitive process by which an individual evaluates alternatives, and
as a result the individual may display di®erent preferences in di®erent frames.1 In such cases, there
is no straightforward method to determine the individual's welfare preferences.
Consider, for example, an individual who is busier on some days of the week than on others. In
making choices, the individual examines the alternatives one after the other and chooses the ¯rst
alternative that he ¯nds satisfactory. On days in which he is busier, the individual is more easily
satis¯ed and hence behaves di®erently than on days in which he is less so. What can we infer about
the individual's welfare ranking of the di®erent alternatives from his "inconsistent" choice behavior?
Similarly, when repeatedly surveying a shopper to learn about his tastes, we may ¯nd that they are
di®erent in each survey. We might conjecture that his underlying preferences are in fact stable across
surveys but that consumer trends are a®ecting his responses. Can we elicit his preferences in the
absence of the trend distortion? A similar question may arise in the context of organizations. We
may hear di®erent members of an organization express somewhat di®erent goals for the organization.
We might conjecture that they all share the same underlying organizational goals, and that the
di®erences in their views result from small misunderstandings or miscommunication. Can we elicit
the actual underlying goals of the organization?
The goal of this paper is to present a framework for eliciting welfare preferences when an individual
is a®ected by framing, and demonstrate the operation of eliciting these preferences for several cog-
nitive processes. In our framework, the welfare of an individual is re°ected by a unique preference
relation2 over a set X of N feasible alternatives. While the welfare relation is not observable, a set
of preference relations, called a behavioral dataset, is. The behavioral dataset contains preference
relations that are postulated to be systematic deviations from the welfare relation. All possible
deviations are described by a consistency function C that attaches to every welfare relation Â the
set of all preference relations C(Â) that may be displayed by the individual in some frame. The
consistency function C speci¯es the possible outputs of the decision maker's cognitive process in
di®erent frames.
Given a behavioral dataset ¤ and a consistency function C, we say that a preference relation Â
is C-consistent with ¤ if every relation in ¤ is a distortion of Â, i.e. it appears in C(Â). If there
exists a preference relation that is C-consistent with ¤, we say that the behavioral dataset ¤ is
C-consistent. For a given consistency function C, we identify conditions on a behavioral dataset
under which it is C-consistent. When a dataset is C-consistent, we characterize the set of preference
1For a choice-theoretic analysis of frame-dependent choice, see Salant and Rubinstein (2008). Bernheim and Rangel
(2007, 2009) independently discuss a similar framework called choice with ancillary conditions.
2A preference relation is a complete, asymmetric and transitive binary relation.
2relations that are C-consistent with the dataset. For example, in the standard approach to welfare, a
decision maker has clear preferences that he maximizes in making choices and thus C(Â) = fÂg, i.e.
the decision maker never distorts his underlying preferences. In this case, if an individual displays
two distinct preference relations, then he is not C-consistent.
An observation in our framework is a full preference relation. This ¯ts situations like surveys
in which a decision maker expresses a complete ranking of the alternatives in each survey. This
also ¯ts situations in which a researcher observes a decision maker choosing inconsistently from
choice problems, and notices that choice behavior can be explained by the maximization of several
preference relations, each applied in a di®erent frame. In both cases, we postulate that any of
the observed preference relations relates to the welfare preferences as described by the consistency
function C but lack a theory explaining how a speci¯c frame distorts the welfare preferences.
Our approach to welfare analysis in the presence of framing e®ects di®ers from the Pareto approach
advocated by Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 2009).3 In the Pareto approach, an alternative a is
Pareto-superior to an alternative b if all the observed preference relations rank a above b. The
resulting Pareto relation is typically a coarse binary relation that becomes even coarser the larger
the behavioral dataset.4
We assert that making explicit assumptions on the process that relates welfare preferences to
behavior is necessary in order to elicit an individual's welfare preferences. By making such assump-
tions, one may sometimes be able to infer the welfare ranking of two alternatives in cases where one
does not Pareto-dominate the other. In fact, applying our approach to some reasonable cognitive
processes may even result in welfare rankings that are opposite to those of the Pareto relation. The
following example demonstrates such a case.
Large mistakes result in small mistakes. Each observed preference relation satis¯es the
following property: If the decision maker makes a \large" mistake by reversing the welfare ranking
of two elements x and z, he also makes \smaller" mistakes by reversing the welfare ranking of x and
y and of y and z for every element y that lies between x and z according to his welfare preferences.
Thus C(Â) = fÂf j if x Â y Â z and z Âf x then z Âf y Âf xg.
Let X = fa;b;c;dg and assume that the behavioral dataset contains the following two orderings:
(Âf) c Âf b Âf a Âf d and
(Âg) d Âg b Âg a Âg c.
Although b Pareto-dominates a, every relation Â that is C-consistent with ¤ = fÂf;Âgg ranks
a above b. To see this, assume to the contrary that b Â a according to some relation Â that is
C-consistent with ¤. Then d is ranked between b and a in Â (i.e. b Â d Â a) since: (i) if d is
welfare-superior to b then Âf = 2 C(Â) and (ii) if d is welfare-inferior to a then Âg= 2 C(Â). Similarly
b Â c Â a. Thus, we have two candidate welfare orderings: (i) b Â d Â c Â a, which is not consistent
3See Manzini and Mariotti for a critical discussion of the Pareto approach.
4Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 2009) call the Pareto relation the unambiguous choice relation.
3with Âf, and (ii) b Â c Â d Â a, which is not consistent with Âg. The two welfare relations that are
C-consistent with ¤ are c Â a Â b Â d and d Â a Â b Â c. Both rank a as welfare-superior to b even
though b Pareto-dominates a.}
The problem of attaching welfare preferences to a behavioral dataset is related, though not iden-
tical, to the fundamental question of social choice theory: to formulate \social welfare" preferences
that aggregate the preference relations of individuals in a society. In a typical social choice analysis,
desirable properties of an aggregation procedure are assumed and impossibility or possibility results
are derived. Our setting is similar to that of the single-pro¯le analysis in social choice theory in the
sense that our aim is to attach a welfare relation to a pro¯le of preference relations.5 In social choice
theory, each of the preference relations in a pro¯le represents an individual in the society while in
our approach each preference relation represents the same individual in a particular frame. The goal
of social choice is to identify a society's welfare preferences while our goal is to uncover those of an
individual.
We depart from standard social choice analysis in two major ways. First, we investigate potential
cognitive deviations from an underlying welfare preference relation rather than the aggregation of
autonomic and probably con°icting preference relations of di®erent individuals. In a social choice
context, this is analogous to the assumption that all preference relations in a pro¯le are obtained from
the same source relation according to a particular rule. Second, we study situations in which the data
is a set of orderings rather than a vector of orderings. Thus, we do not specify which frame results in a
particular preference relation and we do not account for whether the same preference relation appears
in di®erent frames. In the context of social choice, this is analogous to the combination of anonymity
of individuals and invariance to the frequency of each preference relation in the population.
The recent literature on welfare analysis in the model of choice without framing e®ects (including
Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni (2008), Manzini and Mariotti (2008), and Masatlioglu, Naka-
jima and Ozbay (2009)) is also related to our analysis. In this literature, an observer records data
on frame-independent choice behavior. The observer postulates that this data is the outcome of a
speci¯c procedure that uses an underlying preference relation in some structured way. Researchers
in this literature identify conditions under which choice data is consistent with the postulated pro-
cedure and infer the underlying welfare preferences from choice data. Green and Hojman (2007)
advocate a di®erent approach to welfare in the context of choice without framing e®ects. Accord-
ing to their approach, the decision maker has in mind several con°icting considerations that he
\aggregates" in making choices. Given choice data, Green and Hojman characterize the set of the
possible consideration that could have generated this data, and use this information in making
welfare judgements.
In the next three sections, we demonstrate our approach using three scenarios. In the ¯rst, the
decision maker satis¯ces and his aspiration goal is a®ected by framing as in the \busy individual"
example. In the second, frames cause the individual to make small errors when evaluating the
alternatives, as in the organization example. In the third, the frame highlights a single alternative,
5Chambers and Hayashi (2009) investigate how to attach welfare relations to stochastic choice functions. Their
analysis is similar to that of the multi-pro¯le analysis in social choice theory in the sense that it imposes conditions
that connect across stochastic choice functions the operation of attaching preference relations to choice data.
4which bene¯ts from a utility bonus in the spirit of the status quo bias. In each of these three
scenarios, we begin by specifying the consistency function that describes the process by which the
welfare preferences may be distorted by frames. We then identify conditions under which a behavioral
dataset is consistent with the cognitive process behind the consistency function. When the dataset is
consistent, we extrapolate from it the set of candidate welfare preference relations. The ¯nal section
discusses possible extensions of our framework.
2. Satis¯cing
In this section, we have in mind a real-life dilemma. We observe a busy individual making choices
from subsets of fa;b;c;dg. We know that whenever he makes a choice, the individual examines the
available alternatives in the order a;b;c;d. We note that his behavior on Mondays is consistent
with the preference relation c Âm d Âm b Âm a and on Tuesdays with the preference relation
b Ât c Ât d Ât a. How does the individual rank the alternatives b and c { by his preference on
Mondays or by his preference on Tuesdays?
The following argument may make sense in some cases: When choosing from fa;b;c;dg on Mon-
days, the decision maker considers a and b and ¯nds them to be non-satisfactory. He then considers
c and does ¯nd it to be satisfactory. Because on Mondays c is satisfactory and b is not, we conclude
that c is welfare-superior to b. This conclusion is consistent with the decision maker's choice behavior
on Tuesdays when he is probably busier and thus extends the set of satisfactory elements to include
b;c and d.
The implicit premise in the above inference is that the decision maker follows a procedure of
choice that Herbert Simon called Satis¯cing. A satis¯cer has in mind some aspiration goal. When
making choices, he assesses the available alternatives in some pre-determined order and chooses
the ¯rst alternative that meets his aspiration goal. If there is no such alternative, he chooses the
last alternative he encounters. Note that if the order in which the decision maker examines the
alternatives is ¯xed, his behavior is consistent with the maximization of some preference relation.
Satis¯cing behavior may emerge when assessing the precise value of an alternative is costly while
¯guring out whether an alternative is simply \good enough" is less so. For example, in choosing
among risky investment plans, it may be di±cult to assess the expected return on a given plan, but
not as di±cult to assess whether the expected return exceeds the return obtained by a colleague.
Satis¯cing may also emerge when there are search costs involved in considering an additional alter-
native, which the decision maker wishes to economize on. For example, interviewing an additional
candidate for a job may be time consuming and thus a recruiter may settle on a candidate who is
good enough.
In satis¯cing, the set of satisfactory alternatives may vary according to unobservable circumstances
that are not related to the decision maker's welfare, i.e. what we refer to as frames. Going back to
the above examples, an investor may use di®erent colleagues as a source for his aspiration goal in
di®erent circumstances without us being able to observe this. Similarly, a recruiter may expand the
set of satisfactory candidates on busier days; however, as observers, we do not know which days are
5which.
Formally, a satis¯cer classi¯es each element of X as either satisfactory or not. If an element is
satisfactory, so is every element that is welfare-superior to it according to the individual's underlying
welfare preferences. The partition to satisfactory and non-satisfactory elements varies across frames.
A satis¯cer always examines the alternatives in a known pre-de¯ned order O where aOb means that
the decision maker examines a prior to b. He chooses the ¯rst satisfactory alternative he encounters
and, if there are none, the last alternative. The decision maker's choices in frame f are consistent
with maximizing a ranking Âf on X. An observer does not which alternatives are satisfactory, and
records in a behavioral dataset ¤ the decision maker's di®erent rankings.
Let C be the consistency function that attaches to every preference relation Â all the possible
rankings that might be displayed by a satis¯cer who examines the alternatives according to the
order O and whose welfare preference relation is Â. The set C(Â) includes all orderings that are
obtained from Â by:
(1) partitioning the elements of X into two sets, S and X n S, such that every element in S is
Â-superior to every element in X n S,
(2) ranking the elements in S according to O and above all the elements in X n S, and
(3) ranking the elements in X n S opposite to O.
In assessing the welfare of a decision maker whose observed preference relations are recorded in ¤,
we ¯rst test our conjecture that he satis¯ces using the order O. In other words, we check whether
there is a preference relation Â such that ¤ µ C(Â). If this is indeed the case, we proceed to
characterize the set of all preference relations that are C-consistent with ¤, i.e. preference relations
that could have generated the behavioral dataset.
Let us ¯rst de¯ne the binary relation ÂR as follows:
a ÂR b if there are alternatives x and y such that [aOx and a Âf x] and [bOy and y Âf b].
The logic behind this de¯nition is that aOx and a Âf x imply that a is satisfactory in f and
bOy and y Âf b imply that b is not. Hence, a is welfare-superior to b. If, for example, a were not
satisfactory in f, then either x is satisfactory in f in which case x should have been ranked above
a in f or x is not satisfactory in f, in which case x should also have been ranked above a in f.
The following proposition uses ÂR to determine whether a given behavioral dataset can be ex-
plained by satis¯cing. It also establishes that when a behavioral dataset is C-consistent, any exten-
sion of ÂR to a complete and transitive relation is C-consistent with the dataset. In particular, ÂR
is the maximal binary relation nested in any ordering consistent with the given dataset.
Proposition 1. For every behavioral dataset ¤:
6(A) If ÂR is cyclic (where cyclic includes re°exive) then ¤ is not C-consistent.
(B) If ÂR is acyclic then ¤ is C-consistent. Moreover, any extension of ÂR to a complete and
transitive binary relation is C-consistent with ¤.
Proof. We ¯rst note that if a preference relation Â is C-consistent with ¤ then it nests ÂR.
Suppose a ÂR b. Then there is a frame f and two elements x and y such that aOx and a Âf x and
bOy and y Âf b. Because Âf2 C(Â), the element a is satisfactory and the element b is not implying
that a Â b. Part A immediately follows.
To prove part B, suppose that ÂR is acyclic. Consider an extension of ÂR to a complete and
transitive relation Â. To show that Â is C-consistent with the dataset ¤, we identify for every
frame f a set of alternatives S(f) satisfying that (i) every element in S(f) is both Â-superior and
Âf-superior to every element in X nS(f), (ii) the ranking of the elements in S(f) is according to O
and (iii) the ranking of the elements in X n S(f) is opposite to O.
Denote by xmin the O-minimal element in X. That is, xmin is the element that the decision maker
considers last. For a frame f, de¯ne S(f) = fa j a Âf xming. If there is an element z 2 S(f) such
that xmin Â z, then add xmin to S(f). Thus every element in S(f) is Âf-superior to every element
in X n S(f).
Let us see that Â ranks every element a 2 S(f) above every element b 2 X nS(f). If neither a nor
b is xmin, then a ÂR b by setting x = y = xmin in the de¯nition of ÂR and thus a Â b. If a = xmin
then there is z 2 S(f) such that a Â z. Since b;z 6= xmin, we obtain by the previous argument that
z Â b and thus a Â b. If b = xmin then by the de¯nition of S(f), it is Â-inferior to every element in
S(f) including a. Thus (i) holds.
If (ii) does not hold, there are elements a;x 2 S(f), such that aOx yet x Âf a. The elements
a and x di®er from xmin since if xmin 2 S(f) then by the de¯nition of S(f), the element xmin is
both O-minimal and Âf-minimal in S(f). The rankings aOx and x Âf a together with aOxmin and
a Âf xmin imply that a ÂR a contradicting the acyclicity of ÂR.
If (iii) does not hold, there are elements a;x 2 X n S(f), such that aOx and a Âf x. The element
a 6= xmin since xmin is O-minimal in X. The element x 6= xmin since otherwise x is Âf-maximal in
X n S(f). The rankings aOx and a Âf x together with aOxmin and xmin Âf a imply that a ÂR a
contradicting the acyclicity of ÂR. ¥
3. Small assessment errors
In some contexts, an individual may make small errors when evaluating the di®erent alternatives.
This may be because, for example, the alternatives are complicated entities and the individual ¯nd
it di±cult to detect minor details. In such cases, an observed preference relation can reveal the
welfare ranking of two alternatives only if the alternatives are \far apart" from one another in the
observed relation.
7More speci¯cally, consider an individual who views the alternatives in X as evenly spread out
along the utility spectrum, such that the distance between every two adjacent alternatives is iden-
tical. When assessing the value of a given alternative, he may overestimate or underestimate its
value. However, the assessment error is \small", i.e. it is less than the distance between two ad-
jacent alternatives. Thus, evaluation errors change the ordering of two alternatives only when the
alternatives are adjacent in the decision maker's underlying preference relation and the higher one is
underestimated while the lower one is overestimated. In this case, we can infer the welfare ranking
of two alteratives only if there is a third alternative between them. For example, if the dataset
contains the two orderings a Âf b Âf c and b Âg c Âg a then we can conclude that the welfare
preferences are b Â a Â c.
Formally, let C be the consistency function that attaches to a preference relation Â all the rankings
that are obtained from Â by disjoint switches of Â-adjacent alternatives. In other words, C(Â) =
fÂf j a Â b Â c implies a Âf cg.
To examine whether small assessment errors can generate a given behavioral dataset ¤, we ¯rst
de¯ne a ÂR b if there exists Âf in ¤ and an element x such that a Âf x Âf b. The following
proposition uses ÂR to test whether a given behavioral dataset is C-consistent. It establishes that
when the behavioral dataset is C-consistent, any extension of ÂR to a complete and transitive
relation is C-consistent with the dataset. In particular, ÂR is the maximal binary relation nested
in any relation that is C-consistent with the dataset.
Proposition 2. For every behavioral dataset ¤:
(A) If ÂR is cyclic then ¤ is not C-consistent.
(B) If ÂR is 3-acyclic then ¤ is C-consistent.6 Moreover, any extension of ÂR to a complete and
transitive binary relation is C-consistent with ¤.
Proof of 2.A. We show that if there exists a preference relation Â that is C-consistent with ¤
then Â nests ÂR and therefore ÂR is acyclic. Suppose a ÂR b. Then, there is Âf2 ¤ and an element
x such that a Âf x Âf b. Assume to the contrary that b Â a. Then, because a Âf b, there are
no elements ranked between b and a in Â. Therefore, either x is ranked above b in Â contradicting
a Âf x or x is ranked below a in Â contradicting x Âf b. Thus, we cannot have b Â a and because
Â is complete we have that a Â b. We conclude that Â nests ÂR.
Proof of 2.B. We ¯rst show that since ÂR is 3-acyclic, it is acyclic. Suppose ÂR has a cycle and
consider the shortest one x1 ÂR x2 ÂR ::: ÂR xk ÂR x1. Since ÂR is 3-acyclic, we have that k > 3.
Because x1 ÂR x2, there exist Âf in ¤ such that x1 Âf x Âf x2. The element x is not equal to xk
for either k = 3 or k = 4. If xk Âf x then by de¯nition xk ÂR x2, and if x Âf xk then x1 ÂR xk.
In either case we have a shorter cycle.
The relation ÂR is therefore acyclic and can be extended to a complete and transitive relation Â.
6A binary relation S is 3-acyclic if does not contain cycles of three or fewer elements.
8Assume to the contrary that Â is not C-consistent with ¤. Then, there are three elements a, x and
b such that a Â x Â b and b Âf a for some Âf2 ¤. This cannot happen because (i) if x Âf b Âf a
then x ÂR a contradicting a Â x, (ii) if b Âf x Âf a then b ÂR a contradicting a Â b, and (iii) if
b Âf a Âf x then b ÂR x contradicting x Â b. ¥
There may be more than one preference relation that is C-consistent with a given dataset. For
example, if the behavioral dataset contains only one preference relation, then any ranking of the
alternatives obtained from that relation by disjoint switches of adjacent elements is C-consistent
with the dataset. Proposition 3 identi¯es a simple condition on a dataset that is necessary and
su±cient for the existence of a unique preference relation that is C-consistent with the dataset.
Proposition 3. Assume a behavioral dataset ¤ is C-consistent. There exists a unique preference
relation that is C-consistent with ¤ if and only if for every two elements a and b at least one of the
following holds:
(i) There is a preference relation Âf in ¤ and an alternative x such that x is ranked between a
and b in Âf,
(ii) There are two preference relations in ¤ and an alternative x such that according to one of the
relations x is ranked above both a and b and according to the other x is ranked below both of them.
Proof. To prove the if part, it is enough to show that the transitive closure of ÂR relates every
two alternatives a and b because by proposition 2 the relation ÂR and hence its transitive closure
are nested in any relation consistent with ¤.
If (i) holds for two alternatives a and b then ÂR relates a and b. If (ii) holds for a and b, then
we have two frames f and g and an element x such that x is Âf-superior to both a and b and Âg-
inferior to both a and b. Suppose (without loss of generality) that a Âf b. Then a Âg b; otherwise
we would have that x Âf a Âf b and b Âg a Âg x implying both x ÂR b and b ÂR x. Thus, we have
x Âf a Âf b and a Âg b Âg x. Therefore, x ÂR b and a ÂR x and the closure of ÂR connects a and
b.
To prove the only if part, consider two alternatives a and b such that both (i) and (ii) fail. Let
U (D) denote the set of elements that are above (below) both a and b in all frames. Since (i) and
(ii) fail, the sets U and D contain all the elements of X other than a and b. We now show that the
transitive closure of ÂR does not relate a and b. Hence by Proposition 2 both rankings of these two
alternatives are possible. Assume to the contrary that a ÂR x1 ÂR x2 ÂR ::: ÂR xk ÂR b. Then
xk 2 U because xk ÂR b implies there is a frame f and an element y such that xk Âf y Âf b. By
iterating this argument, we obtain that x1 2 U. But by a ÂR x1, we have that x1 is ranked two or
more places below a in some frame and thus x1 2 D.¥
4. Highlighting a single alternative
9We survey an individual repeatedly to learn about his tastes and note that his reports are in-
consistent. We suspect that in each report the individual assigns a utility bonus to one of the
alternatives while preserving the ranking of the others. This may be because the decision maker
recently chose that alternative or because it re°ects a current consumer trend. In other words, the
high ranking of an alternative may be an outcome of a psychological \status quo bias". We do not
know which alternative gets the bonus nor its size and wish to elicit the individual's preferences net
of the psychological bias.
Consider, for example, a dataset containing the two relations a Âf b Âf c and b Âg c Âg a. In
this case, we can conclude that either a or c must be ranked last in any welfare preferences that
are consistent with the dataset. If c is ranked last, then c got a bonus in g and thus the welfare
preferences must be b Â a Â c, which is consistent with b getting a bonus in f. If a is ranked last
then a got a bonus in f and the welfare preferences must be b Â c Â a, which is consistent with no
element getting a meaningful bonus in g. In any case, we can conclude that b Â a;c.
More formally, let C be the consistency function that assigns to a preference relation Â all the
relations that are obtained from Â by advancing a single alternative to a weakly higher position, i.e.





+ 1 preference relations including the relation Â.
An observer conjectures that a given dataset ¤ was generated by the above mechanism. Clearly, if
¤ contains a single ordering Âf, then Âf and every preference relation that is obtained from it by
moving down a single alternative is C-consistent with ¤. We now discuss a simple way of identifying
whether a dataset ¤ containing two or more orderings is C-consistent, and eliciting an ordering that
is C-consistent with ¤.
Denote by T ½ X the largest set of elements such that all orderings in ¤ rank the elements in T
below the elements in X nT and agree on the ordering of the elements in T. Thus, T is the common
Tail of all the orderings in ¤. The dataset ¤ consists of more than one ordering and hence T 6= X.
Of course, T may be empty as in the above example.
Let A µ X n T be the set of elements such that x 2 A if x appears right above the elements of T
in some Âf2 ¤. That is, A = fx j x is Âf -minimal in X nT for some Âf2 ¤g. Denote by ¤x µ ¤
the set of all orderings in which the alternative x is minimal among all the elements in X n T. In
the above example, A = fa;cg, ¤a = fÂgg and ¤c = fÂfg.
Proposition 4. If a dataset ¤ contains at least two orderings and is C-consistent, then
(i) the set A contains two alternatives, and
(ii) for one of the alternatives b 2 A, the ordering of X n fbg is identical across all orderings in
¤a where a is the other element in A and expanding this ordering by positioning b right below a is
C-consistent with ¤.
10Proof. (i) Assume Â is C-consistent with ¤. By de¯nition, jAj ¸ 2. Assume to the contrary that
jAj > 2. Then there are three elements a, b and c and three orderings Âf, Âg and Âh in ¤ such that
a;b Âf c, a;c Âg b and b;c Âh a. Suppose without loss of generality that a is Â-minimal among a;b
and c. Then, a jumped in frames f and g implying that the relative ranking of b and c in these two
frames should be identical in contradiction to b Âf c and c Âg b.
(ii) Assume that Â is C-consistent with ¤. Let a and b be the two alternatives in A such that
a Â b. Then the element b jumps in all the orderings in ¤a and hence any ordering in ¤a restricted
to X n fbg is identical to Â restricted to the same set. If b is Â-superior to all the elements in T,
then Â is the ordering described in (ii). Otherwise, there is an element x 2 T such that x Â b. This
implies that b jumps in all the orderings in ¤ and they all rank b above the elements of T implying
that the ordering described in (ii) is C-consistent with ¤. ¥
Thus, in order to test whether a dataset ¤ is C-consistent, we need only to ascertain whether
one of the two candidate orderings described in Proposition 4 is C-consistent with ¤. In addition,
the proof of Proposition 4 implies that if an ordering Â is C-consistent with ¤ then Â is obtained
from one of the two candidate orderings described in the proposition, Â0, by moving down in Â0 the
Â0-minimal element in X n T.
5. Discussion
This paper analyzes situations in which the same decision maker displays di®erent preference
relations in various circumstances that di®er in payo®-irrelevant parameters. An observer conjectures
that this is the result of systematic deviations from a preference relation that re°ects the individual's
welfare and he wishes to elicit the welfare relation from the observed preference relations. In the
previous sections, we demonstrated the elicitation process for several scenarios. We conclude with a
discussion of possible modi¯cations of the framework.
5.1. Observing the frame
In our framework, an observer knows which preference relations could be obtained from the welfare
preferences. This is summarized in the consistency function C. However, the observer does not know
what the actual frames are or the way in which each speci¯c frame distorts the underlying preferences.
An alternative framework would be one in which the observer knows these details. Formally, a
behavioral dataset is a set ¤ = f(Âf;f)g in which each observation includes a preference relation and
the distorting frame. The way in which each frame distorts the welfare preferences is summarized by a
consistency function that takes both the underlying preference relation and the frame as parameters.
We denote by C(Â;f) the set of behavioral preference relations that can be obtained from the
underlying welfare ordering Â under the frame f. A relation Â is C-consistent with ¤ if for every
(Âf;f) 2 ¤ we have that Âf2 C(Â;f). The following example demonstrates the elicitation process
in the modi¯ed framework.
11Highlighting multiple alternatives. Consider a case in which a set of alternatives is highlighted
by some external mechanism. Examples include a web site where some of the alternatives are
presented in bold font or a grocery store that positions some products near the cashier in order
to attract attention to them. A highlighted alternative gets a non-negative utility bonus and its
ranking with respect to non-highlighted alternatives is weakly improved. The ranking among the
non-highlighted alternatives is identical to that of the welfare preference relation while the ranking
among the highlighted alternatives may di®er from that of the welfare relation. Formally, the set of
highlighted alternatives f is a subset of X and C(Â;f) = fÂf j if [b Â a and a Âf b] then a 2 fg.
Suppose we observe both the preference relation Âf and the set of highlighted elements f. Then
we can infer the welfare ranking between a non-highlighted alternative and any element that is Âf-
inferior to it. De¯ne a ÂR b if there exists a frame f such that a Âf b and a = 2 f. We now show
that for any dataset ¤ = f(Âf;f)g the set of orderings that are C-consistent with ¤ is the set of all
complete and transitive extensions of ÂR.
Let Â be a preference relation that is C-consistent with ¤. Note that if a ÂR b then in some
frame f, we have that a = 2 f and a Âf b. This implies that a Â b since otherwise b Â a and a Âf b
would imply that a 2 f. Thus, ÂR is nested in any preference relation that is C-consistent with ¤.
Consider a complete and transitive extension of ÂR denoted by Â. In order to determine whether
Â is C-consistent with ¤, we need to verify that if a Â b and b Âf a then b 2 f. Otherwise, b = 2 f
and b Âf a imply that b ÂR a and thus, since Â extends ÂR, we cannot have that a Â b. }
5.2. Cardinal Utilities
In our framework, welfare preferences are ordinal. There are cases, however, in which describing
the cognitive process that distorts welfare preferences requires a notion of the intensity of these
preferences. For example, in the context of advertising, the decision maker may prefer product a
to product b; however, the number of times he views the same advertisement for each product may
in°uence his choice between them. In order to describe the magnitude of the advertising bias in the
decision maker's preferences, we need to add a notion of cardinal utility.
Advertising. The decision maker is characterized by a utility function u that assigns positive
values to di®erent alternatives and represents his welfare preferences. Before making a choice, the
decision maker views advertisements for the various alternatives. We refer to this information as
a frame and de¯ne it formally as a function i : X ! N that assigns to every alternative x 2 X
the number of ads i(x) for that alternative. After viewing the ads, the decision maker maximizes
i(x)u(x) rather than u(x). We can observe i and the resulting preferences Âi but not u.
We say that Â is consistent with the dataset ¤ = f(Âi;i)g if there is a utility representation u of Â
such that for every observation (Âi;i) the function u(x)i(x) represents Âi. The existence of such a
function u is equivalent to the existence of a solution to a system of inequalities in the jXj unknowns
fu(x)gx2X, where each inequality is of the form i(x)u(x) > i(y)u(y) for x Âi y. In particular we
can conclude that x Â y if i(y) ¸ i(x) and x Âi y for some (Âi;i) in the dataset. }
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